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THE DOCTRINE OF THE IMPLIED INSURED
IN ALASKA: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONCERNING THIRD PARTIES TO
INSURANCE CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Supreme Court recently expanded the rights of third
parties under insurance contracts in Stewart-Smith Haidinger v. Avi-
Truck Inc.I In this case, the owner of a destroyed aircraft gained
standing to raise a claim under an insurance policy obtained by a
lessee of the aircraft, even though the insurance policy named the
lessee as the owner and the insurance company did not know of the
true owner's existence. The court concluded that "[w]here the risk to
the insurer is unchanged, and where a third party is within the class
intended to be benefitted by the parties to an insurance contract, a
third-party beneficiary insurance contract may be implied at law."'2
This decision marked the first time the Alaska Supreme Court permit-
ted an impliedly insured third-party beneficiary to affirmatively en-
force rights within an insurance contract, thus expanding the scope of
the public policy favoring extension of insurance coverage to noncon-
tracting parties in certain circumstances.
While the particular result in Stewart-Smith Haidinger may be
desirable from a public policy perspective as protecting the insurance
consumer, the broad language of the opinion should not serve as the
basis for an unqualified expansion of the courts' doctrine of the im-
plied insured. 3 This note will suggest reasons for limiting the impact
of this decision through exploring the principles underlying the doc-
trine of the implied insured and the possible shortcomings in the crite-
ria used by the court to identify the beneficiaries of an insurance
contract. As this note will point out, the court's opinion in Stewart-
Smith Haidinger failed to provide any workable standards for the in-
surer to use in evaluating the risk it is being asked to assume in a
particular contract. Specifically, the court failed to recognize that
Copyright 0 1986 by Alaska Law Review
1. 682 P.2d 1108 (Alaska 1984).
2. Id. at 1113. A third-party beneficiary of one of these implied contracts will
hereinafter be referred to as an "implied insured."
3. See Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska Communications, 623 P.2d 1216 (Alaska
1981).
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insurance contracts are exercises in foresight; a contract must be eval-
uated by considering the potentialities existing at the time the contract
was written rather than considering the events as they ultimately un-
folded. If Stewart-Smith Haidinger is read broadly without this sensi-
tivity, its implications will cause the insurance industry considerable
difficulty in evaluating policy risks and thus undermine the ability of
insurers to calculate the appropriate premium necessary to cover those
risks.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE IMPLIED INSURED
DOCTRINE IN ALASKA
The decision in Stewart-Smith Haidinger is consistent with
Alaska's public policy of interpreting insurance contracts in a manner
that generally favors the insured. The Alaska Supreme Court has fol-
lowed the general trend by declaring that insurance policies are con-
tracts of adhesion4 and that the purpose of Title 21 of the Alaska
Statutes,5 which regulates the insurance industry, is to protect the
Alaska policyholder.6 The judicial doctrine of the implied insured,
which permits noncontracting parties to enforce insurance contracts,
has thus emerged from a legal framework that favors the insured
rather than the insurer.7 Until Stewart-Smith Haidinger, however, the
Alaska Supreme Court had applied the doctrine of the implied insured
only for the benefit of noncontracting parties who were defending sub-
rogation claims.
Prior to Stewart-Smith Haidinger, the Alaska Supreme Court had
explicitly recognized the existence of the implied insured doctrine in
two cases: Alaska Insurance Co. v. RCA Alaska Communications8 and
Olympic, Inc. v. Providence Washington Insurance Co. of Alaska.9 In
RCA, the doctrine was first recognized as a defense to a subrogation
action rather than as a third-party right to recover the proceeds of the
policy.10 RCA involved a fire insurance policy obtained by a landlord
4. Stordahl v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 65 (Alaska 1977).
5. ALASKA STAT. § 21.03.010 -. 90.110 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
6. Northern Adjusters v. Dep't of Revenue, 627 P.2d 205, 207 (Alaska 1981).
7. The creation of an implied at law contract has been recognized in Alaska as a
judicial tool to prevent unjust enrichment. 'Martens v. Metzgar, 524 P.2d 666, 672
(Alaska 1974). Such a creation should be undertaken, not only to stop one party from
unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another, but also to require him to make
restitution for benefits received, retained, or appropriated, id., provided that the resti-
tution involves no violation or frustration of law or opposition to public policy, either
directly or indirectly. Tulalip Shores, Inc. v. Mortland, 9 Wash. App. 271, 274-75,
511 P.2d 1402, 1404 (1973) (discussing the nature of restitution).
8. 623 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Alaska 1981).
9. 648 P.2d 1008, 1014 (Alaska 1982).
10. RCA, 623 P.2d at 1217.
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in accordance with a lease provision. When a fire caused by the negli-
gence of a commercial tenant destroyed the property, the insurance
company paid the landlord for his loss. The supreme court, however,
denied the insurance company's subsequent attempt to recover its loss
from the tenant.11
The court employed a multi-stepped analysis to support its find-
ing that the landlord's policy had impliedly insured the tenant as well
as the landlord, at least for purposes of determining the insurer's sub-
rogation rights. First, the court acknowledged the rule that "an in-
surer cannot recover by means of subrogation against its own
insured."' 12 Such an action would allow the insurer to undermine the
entire purpose of insurance, namely the shifting of the risk of loss to
another for a fee. Second, the court identified a public policy reason
for disallowing the insurer's claim against the tenant - reducing liti-
gation by the denial of this subrogation claim.13 Finally, the court
noted that "Since the ordinary and usual meaning of 'loss by fire' in-
cludes fires of negligent origin, it would contradict the reasonable ex-
pectations of a commercial tenant to allow a landlord's insurer to
proceed against it after the landlord had contracted in the lease to
provide fire insurance on the leased premises."' 14 The court therefore
applied the doctrine of the implied insured in finding that the policy
covered a noncontracting party, but only for "the limited purpose of
defeating a subrogation claim."' 15
The supreme court, however, declined to apply the doctrine of the
implied insured one year later in Olympic. In that case, a landlord
sought indemnification through his commercial tenant's liability insur-
ance policy. The landlord sought this indemnification to cover his lia-
bility for damages from a wrongful death action brought on behalf of a
firefighter who died fighting a blaze on the leased premises. 16 The
lease between the landlord and tenant required the commercial tenant
to provide liability insurance for the store premises on behalf of the
landlord. The commercial tenant obtained such a policy, but did so
only in its own name. 17 In declining to apply RCA, the court noted an
important underlying difference between the two cases:
11. Id.
12. Id. (quoting Graham v. Rockman, 504 P.2d 1351, 1356 (Alaska 1972)).
13. Id. at 1219 n.3 (noting that reducing the number of insurance claims being
litigated is one policy objective met by denying this type of subrogation claim).
14. Id. at 1219.
15. Id. at 1218 (quoting Rizzuto v. Morris, 22 Wash. App. 951, 956, 592 P.2d
688, 690 (1979)).
16. Olympic, 648 P.2d at 1009.
17. Id. at 1009-10.
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The dispositive distinction between the present case [Olympic] and
RCA is that in RCA the insurer seeking subrogation had contractu-
ally agreed to insure against loss due to fire. . . . It is from that
context which we assessed the reasonable expectations of the parties
with respect to fire loss due to the tenant's negligence. In contrast,
...Providence [the tenant's insurer] did not contractually agree to
insure against risks attributable to [the landlord].18
The nature of the underlying insurance policy thus distinguished the
facts in Olympic from those in RCA. The addition of another party to
the liability insurance policy involved in Olympic would have indi-
cated an alteration of the risk the insurer believed it had assumed, and
thus was "determinative in deciding whether to imply additional in-
sureds on an insurance policy." 19 As the insurer based the premium
rates on the risk insured, the rates would presumably have differed if
the landlord had also been covered by the policy.20 In contrast, the
RCA court found that risk of loss by a fire caused by the tenant was, in
fact, contemplated by the parties at the time they entered their con-
tract. It was thus fair to prohibit the insurer from seeking compensa-
tion from the tenant for a loss generated by a risk he and the landlord
had contemplated and presumably incorporated in the landlord's
premiums.
III. STEWART-SMITH HAIDINGER V A vI-TRUCK, INa: FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Trans-Northern Aleutian ("TNA") was an Anchorage-based air
transport company 2 that operated a fleet of small aircraft. 22 In an
effort to expand its fleet, TNA began looking for a larger aircraft that
could transport large equipment. TNA located such an aircraft in
Palmer during the summer of 1976 and arranged to have it ferried to
Anchorage in early December, 1976.
Rather than purchasing the aircraft outright, TNA decided to
lease the aircraft. Two TNA mechanics and their wives then formed
Avi-Truck, which purchased the aircraft on December 29, 1976, and
leased it to TNA on January 14, 1977. The terms of the lease agree-
ment required TNA to insure the hull of the aircraft for $60,000.23
18. Id. at 1014.
19. Stewart-Smith Haidinger, 682 P.2d at 1112.
20. Olympic, 648 P.2d at 1014.
21. Prior to this litigation, the Alaska Department of Commerce and Economic
Development issued a certificate of involuntary dissolution of Trans-Northern Aleu-
tian, Inc. Brief for Appellant at 15, Stewart-Smith Haidinger v. Avi-Truck, Inc., 682
P.2d 1108 (Alaska 1984).




TNA obtained an insurance policy on the hull of the plane from
Jack Good, an employee of a local insurance brokerage firm.24 The
original binder25 of December 13, 1976, was to insure the aircraft
while it was ferried from Palmer to Anchorage and while it was on the
ground in Anchorage. TNA acquired this binder approximately two
weeks prior to Avi-Truck's actual purchase of the aircraft. Insurance
covering the aircraft when it was in flight was added on January 24,
1977. As Alaska Statebank was financing the purchase of the aircraft,
Good issued the binder naming the bank as a loss payee.26 The binder
indicated that a new policy would be issued to cover the recently ac-
quired aircraft. The coverage was ultimately effected, however, by ad-
ding the new aircraft to an existing insurance policy covering the hulls
of TNA's other aircraft.27 The endorsement adding the new aircraft
to the fleet policy was not issued until February 8, 1977.28 Avi-Truck
was not named as an insured on any of the binders or on TNA's fleet
policy.
The aircraft crashed on January 31, 1977. Shortly thereafter,
Alaska Statebank sued Avi-Truck in order to collect on the loan it had
granted for the purchase of the aircraft. Avi-Truck then filed a third-
party complaint against Stewart-Smith Haidinger, Inc., TNA's in-
surer, and certain other British insurance companies that had accepted
TNA's policies, claiming that Avi-Truck was entitled to the proceeds
of the TNA insurance policy.29 Both parties filed cross-motions for
partial summary judgment on a number of issues.3 0 Judge Singleton
24. The parties dispute whether the insurance agent was told that TNA did not
own the aircraft. The president of TNA claims that he told the insurer that TNA
would be leasing the aircraft; the insurance agent assumed that TNA owned it. Id.
25. A binder exists when an agent exercises his power to bind the insurer immedi-
ately upon the insured's application for coverage. The formal papers that will consti-
tute the policy will follow at a later date. ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.240 (1984); see
generally 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 219 (1982).
26. Brief for Appellee at 4.
27. The binders stated that the aircraft was to be covered under a new policy
rather than under TNA's fleet policy. Brief for Appellee at 5. An error at the in-
surer's offices caused the aircraft to be covered by an endorsement to the fleet policy
rather than by a new policy. Id. at 8.
28. 682 P.2d at 1111.
29. Id. Avi-Truck also claimed to be the assignee of TNA and Alaska Statebank.
The trial court denied the claim of assignment by TNA. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment on this issue for the insurer, apparently agreeing with Stewart-Smith
Haidinger that TNA had lost the capacity to assign its rights since it had been dis-
solved by the State of Alaska. Brief for Appellee at 29. No appeal was made upon
this issue. Stewart-Smith Haidinger, 682 P.2d at 1111-12 n.1.
30. 682 P.2d at 1111. In addition to the issue of standing, the trial court was
required to construe many policy exceptions contained in the contract. Id. While
these facts are relevant to the particular risk insured by the binder, they are not rele-




entered an "Order for Partial Summary Judgment and to Simplify Is-
sues" that granted Avi-Truck standing to sue TNA's insurers under
TNA's insurance contract.31
The insurance policy in Stewart-Smith Haidinger resembled the
policy involved in RCA in that it insured the owner's property interest
in the aircraft itself rather than insuring against an individual's per-
sonal liability for injuries sustained from the operation of the aircraft
as had been the case in Olympic. Stewart-Smith Haidinger indicates,
however, that the nature of the policy as insuring property rather than
personal liability is not alone sufficient to permit recovery by an un-
named beneficiary; the court also held that the third party must be
within the class intended to be benefitted by the insured risk.32 Thus,
in order to fully appreciate the Stewart-Smith Haidinger holding, it is
necessary to clarify what constitutes the insured risk as it pertains to
the parties to the insurance contract, and to develop a method to as-
certain if the parties fully comprehended that risk when they entered
into the insurance contract.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT
A. Defining the Risk
The nature of insurance is in contract. 33 For an agreed upon
price, the insurer will bear the risk that agreed upon future events will
occur to the detriment of the insured. Alaska law states that an insur-
ance contract may only be enforced by someone who had an insurable
interest in the insured item at the time the risk was realized in a loss. 34
The Stewart-Smith Haidinger court found that adding the true owners
of the aircraft to the policy as beneficiaries did not alter the risk that
the insurers originally had agreed to take.35 The insurers claimed that
the addition of Avi-Truck altered the risk because Avi-Truck had re-
served the right to do maintenance on the aircraft and Avi-Truck, un-
31. Id. at 1111. The trial court found that:
The third-party plaintiffs were within the class of persons contemplated to be
covered by insurance at the time the insurance contract was negotiated, i.e.,
within the class of owners and operators of the aircraft. The court further
finds that the persons contemplated to operate the aircraft, the pilots con-
templated to fly it, and the persons contemplated to service the aircraft, re-
mained unchanged at all times during the negotiation of coverage and
thereafter, and that the risk to the carriers was not effected [sic] by ultimate
ownership of the aircraft being placed in Avi-Truck, Inc.
Id. (quoting the findings provided by the trial court).
32. Id. at 1113.
33. ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.150 (1984).
34. Id § 21.42.030 (1984).




like TNA, was not a certified carrier. 36 According to the insurers,
both of these factors indicated that Avi-Truck was able to control the
aircraft and thus increase the risk of its loss. 37 The court disagreed,
reasoning that the reservation of maintenance work was a distinction
without a difference since the mechanics for TNA and the owners of
Avi-Truck were the same people. The actual maintenance performed
upon the aircraft would be the same regardless of the titles accorded
the workers, either as TNA mechanics or as owners of Avi-Truck.38
Additionally, since TNA and not Avi-Truck would be operating the
plane, Avi-Truck's lack of certification was irrelevant to the risk the
insurers agreed to undertake. 39
The court's evaluation of the risk overlooks some important con-
siderations. In stressing the events that actually occurred prior to the
crash, the court ignored the fact that insurance policies are drafted
with a concern toward the probabilities of future occurrences. The
court was overly impressed with the facts as they actually occurred
because they fell within the anticipated events: TNA did operate the
aircraft as part of its fleet and the TNA mechanics did service the
aircraft.
It is not unreasonable, however, to imagine that Avi-Truck's
ownership interest and the provisions in the lease could have created
other scenarios. 40 Avi-Truck could possibly have utilized different
maintenance techniques as the owner of the aircraft; Avi-Truck could
even have ordered other mechanics to do the work, thus taking the
control of the aircraft out of TNA's hands. Of course, TNA did oper-
ate the aircraft without interference from Avi-Truck and the mainte-
nance was provided by mechanics who could be identified as serving
both Avi-Truck and TNA. This focus on the events as they actually
unfolded, however, ignores the before-mentioned possibilities that ex-
isted at the time of the contract'sformation due to Avi-Truck's owner-
ship of the aircraft. Had the insurer been aware at the time of
contracting of the different potentialities presented by Avi-Truck's
ownership, the terms of the policy might well have been differed. The
fact that Avi-Truck failed to act in a manner revealing that TNA was
36. Id.
37. Brief for Appellant at 33. See also id. at 26 (arguing that whether Avi-Truck's
failure to obtain an airworthiness certificate materially altered the risk should be a
question of fact decided by the jury, not by the judge in a summary judgment motion).
38. Stewart-Smith Haidinger, 682 P.2d at 1113.
39. Id.
40. Ownership includes the right to control the property. Some jurisdictions have
held that this right creates an essentially changed risk. See, e.g., Otsego Aviation Serv.
v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 277 A. D. 612, 616, 102 N.Y.S. 2d 344, 347 (1951).
While not expressing whether this reflected a greater risk, the court did note that
Avi-Truck, unlike TNA, was not a certified carrier. 682 P.2d at 1113.
1986]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
merely leasing the aircraft and did not own it should have no bearing
upon the court's discussion of the risk, which is evaluated in terms of
the potential for occurrences. Insurance contracts are exercises in
foresight in which parties attempt to shift from one party to another
the risk that a particular future event will occur. Thus, the risk these
contracts insure against must be evaluated with sensitivity to the po-
tentialities in existence at the time the contracts were written rather
than with deference to the way the risks played themselves out.41
Moreover, the court's analysis in Stewart-Smith Haidinger fails to
recognize the increased burden faced by an insurer when additional,
noncontracting parties are permitted to enforce the insurance policy,
regardless of any possible control the additional parties may have over
the property prior to its loss. 42 This additional burden arises during
the payment process in two ways. First, an increased number of poten-
tial claimants forces the insurer into greater expenditures of time and
money, and possibly into greater litigation, to determine the rightful
recipient of the insurance proceeds. Second, the insurer faces an ad-
ded risk of paying the wrong party. Neither of these burdens would be
present if the rights under the contract were limited to the bargaining
parties. 43
The burdens the insurer in Stewart-Smith Haidinger confronted
do not seem to include the fear of wrongful payment because TNA
was dissolved by the State of Alaska and could no longer exercise its
contractual rights.44 Thus, the insurers were subject only to Avi-
Truck's claims to the proceeds. If, however, the court's justification in
finding Avi-Truck to be impliedly insured was the fact that Avi-Truck
was the sole remaining payee, the court's method once again illustrates
41. This distinction may be illustrated by the following example:
Assume that R agrees to insure the boat of S against its sinking during a trip
across the pond. Unknown to R, the boat has a plug in its bottom and S has
the ability to remove that plug if she should so desire. It is also possible for
the plug to loosen itself without any assistance from S. Fortunately for all
concerned, the boat completes the voyage without incident.
According to the court's analysis, because the boat completed its journey with the
plug in place, the fact that the plug could have been removed is of no consequence.
The more complete analysis would recognize that the mere existence of the plug
would increase the risk of an unsuccessful voyage. The fact that the plug did not fail
does not diminish the fact that it could have been loosened, causing the boat to sink.
One should thus be careful to distinguish between the result achieved and the poten-
tial results that were possible yet avoided. The latter are more indicative of the defini-
tion of risk.
42. American Financial Corp. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1182,
1185 (D. Del. 1983).
43. Id. It should be noted that the use of interpleader procedures by the insurer
could diminish this risk of wrongful payment. Yet the use of such a device assumes
that the insurer has agreed to its underlying liability for the proposed loss.
44. Brief for Appellee at 29.
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the inappropriateness of hindsight analysis. Future courts wishing to
apply the doctrine of the implied insured may not confront cases so
neatly confined to one possible payee. More importantly, the supreme
court did not state whether the doctrine of the implied insured was
limited to situations in which a single payee claimed entitlement to the
proceeds; so confining the doctrine would avoid possible future litiga-
tion to eliminate contenders for the proceeds. The Stewart-Smith
Haidinger decision did not address itself to these factors, preferring
instead to handle the situation with the general requirement that the
risk not be altered.
B. Determining the Class to be Benefitted
The second important element of the Stewart-Smith Haidinger
decision is the manner in which the court identified the intended bene-
ficiaries of the insurance contract. According to the Alaska Supreme
Court, third parties desiring to utilize the doctrine of the implied in-
sured must be within the class intended by the contracting parties to
benefit from the insurance policy.4 5
In assessing this intent, the court in Stewart-Smith Haidinger ap-
pears to have gone beyond the general rules it had previously ex-
pressed regarding contract interpretation. In Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v.
New Hampshire Insurance Co.,46 the court held that where the terms
of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous, the intent of the
parties must be ascertained from the instrument itself.47 Where the
terms are uncertain or ambiguous, though, intent may be ascertained
from the language and conduct of the parties, the objects the parties
sought to accomplish, and the surrounding circumstances at the time
they negotiated the contract. 48
Whenever possible, the court will utilize the definitions provided
in the policy itself to determine the intent of the parties.49 Yet, a court
45. 682 P.2d at 1113; accord Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Forth Corp., 663 F.2d
751, 759 (7th Cir. 1981) (construing Indiana law); Hylte Bruks Aktiebolag v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 399 F.2d 289, 292 (2d Cir. 1968) (construing New York law). See also
Tolifson v. Globe Am. Casualty Co., 138 Ariz. 31, 32, 672 P.2d 983, 984 (Ct. App.
1983); City of Milwaukee v. Allied Smelting Corp., 117 Wis.2d 377, 383, 344 N.W.2d
523, 525 (Ct. App. 1983); Logan v. Gans, 277 Pa. Super. 282, 284-85, 419 A.2d 772,
774 (1980); Stewart v. Gainesville Glass Co., 131 Ga. App. 747, 752, 206 S.E.2d 857,
860 (1974).
46. 407 P.2d 1009 (Alaska 1965).
47. Id. at 1013; see also Werley v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 498 P.2d 112, 116
(Alaska 1972); Marwell Constr., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 465 P.2d
298, 304 (Alaska 1970). The interpretation of contracts is thus treated in the same
manner as a question of law. National Bank of Alaska v. J. B. L. & K. of Alaska, 546
P.2d 579, 586 (Alaska 1979) (utilizing a clearly erroneous standard).
48. Pepsi, 407 P.2d at 1013.
49. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 663 P.2d 953, 955
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need not interpret an insurance contract strictly by its literal terms
even when those terms are unambiguous. In Stordahl v. Government
Employees Insurance, 50 the court demonstrated its protective attitude
toward policyholders when it ruled that insurance policies were con-
tracts of adhesion.51 Both the superior bargaining power of the insur-
ance company and the lack of expertise on the part of the consumer
underscore the need for this protective public policy.5 2 Thus, to assure
the consumer is protected, the language of the contract "should be
construed to provide the coverage which a lay person would reason-
ably have expected." '53
Alaska also accepts the nearly unanimous rule that ambiguities in
an insurance policy are to be resolved in favor of the insured.5 4 An
ambiguity does not exist, however, merely because the parties disagree
as to the interpretation of any of the contract terms.55 An ambiguity
exists only where the contract as a whole, evaluated in light of all the
extrinsic evidence, 56 supports two different, yet reasonable interpreta-
(Alaska 1983); Tenopir v. State Farm Mut. Co., 403 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1968)
(construing Alaska law).
50. 564 P.2d 63 (Alaska 1977).
51. Id. at 65.
52. Insurance policies are considered contracts of adhesion because the insured is
usually presented with a form contract on a take it or leave it basis. Id. at 65 n.4; see
also Hahn v. Alaska Title Guar. Co., 557 P.2d 143, 145 n.5 (Alaska 1976).
53. Stordahl, 564 P.2d at 66. A court is not required to find that contract lan-
guage is ambiguous prior to using this rule of construction. Id.
54. Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 387 P.2d 104,
108-09 (Alaska 1963); accord Simmons Ref. Co. v. Royal-Globe Ins. Co., 543 F.2d
1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 1976); Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 613, 615, 299 S.E.
2d 561, 563 (1983); Bailey v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 258 Or. 201, 210, 474
P.2d 746, 751 (1970), reh'g denied, 258 Or. 228, 482 P.2d 158 (1971).
55. Modem Constr., Inc. v. Barce, Inc., 556 P.2d 528, 529 (Alaska 1976). Differ-
ing testimony among the parties as to their subjective intent does not necessarily estab-
lish an issue of fact regarding the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time
they entered into the contract. Such self-serving statements of intent are not consid-
ered to be probative. Peterson v. Wirum, 625 P.2d 866, 870 (Alaska 1981). The par-
ties' testimony recounting their subjective intentions or understandings will normally
accomplish no more than the restatement of the conflicting positions. Day v. A. & G.
Constr. Co., 528 P.2d 440, 444 (Alaska 1974). "Rather, the court must look to ex-
press manifestations of each party's understanding of the contract in attempting to
give effect to the intent behind the agreement." Peterson, 625 P.2d at 870.
56. Extrinsic evidence refers to evidence other than the language of the contract
that bears on the parties' intentions. Wright v. Vickaryou, 598 P.2d 490, 497 n.22
(Alaska 1979). The correct role of extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of contracts
has not always been clear in Alaska. Initially, the supreme court had implied that
extrinsic evidence could be used only after a preliminary finding of ambiguity. See
Wessells v. State, 562 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Alaska 1977); Tsakres v. Owens, 561 P.2d
1218, 1221-22 (Alaska 1977); Hendricks v. Knik Supply, Inc., 522 P.2d 543, 546
(Alaska 1974). Approval of this use of the evidence was actually two-tiered, however,
as the court would first consider extrinsic evidence in order to determine if a contract
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tions.57 Furthermore, the court's ability to interpret ambiguities in
contracts does not give it the power to ignore or rewrite insurance
contracts that are plain on their faces by creating ambiguities where
none in truth exist.58 The role of the court is not to do violence to the
terms of the contract by artificially creating ambiguities where none
exist, but to honor the intentions of the parties.5 9 The court must in-
terpret the contract to uphold the true intentions of the parties even
when that interpretation favors the insurer.60
Under its latest articulation by the Alaska Supreme Court, the
doctrine of the implied insured has apparently exceeded the bounds of
the general legal framework for the construction of insurance con-
tracts. First, the court in Stewart-Smith Haidinger did not find that
the terms of the policy were ambiguous on the issue of the insured's
identity.61 Because the court did not find the policy to be ambiguous,
provision was ambiguous. Then, the court would re-examine the same evidence to
interpret the contract. Tsakres, 561 P.2d at 1223 (Boochever, C.J., concurring). The
supreme court has since moved away from this two-tiered test and has held that all
extrinsic evidence should be utilized in finding the parties' true intention. Wright, 598
P.2d at 497 n.22; Stordahl, 564 P.2d at 66; accord 3 A. CORBIN, CoNTRACTS § 536, at
25-30 (1960).
57. Stordahl, 564 P.2d at 67 n.13. Words must be examined in the context in
which they are used. A finding that a word or phrase isolated from its context is
susceptible to more than one meaning does not make that word or phrase ambiguous.
Similarly, the fact that a word or phrase in its context supports one reasonable and
one unreasonable meaning does not mean that the term is ambiguous if the meaning of
the provision as a whole is clear. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Cordova
Airlines, 283 F.2d 659, 665 (9th Cir. 1960).
58. Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Alaska 1979); accord Mercantile Bank and
Trust Co. v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1969) (constru-
ing Kansas law); Hercules Casualty Ins. Co. v. Preferred Risk Ins. Co., 337 F.2d 1, 4
(10th Cir. 1964) (construing Oklahoma law); Southeastern Fidelity Ins. v. Suwannee
Lumber Mfg. Co., 411 So. 2d 950, 951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Eaglestein v. Pacific
Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 377 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
59. Ness v. National Indem. Co. of Nebraska, 247 F. Supp. 944, 947-48 (D.
Alaska 1965) (construing Alaska law).
60. The United States Supreme Court has addressed this rule of construction for
insurance policies. The rule developed in Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 284 U.S.
489 (1932), is similar to that currently employed in Alaska:
It is true that where the terms of a policy are of doubtful meaning, that
construction most favorable to the insured will be adopted. This canon of
construction is both reasonable and just, since the words of the policy are
chosen by the insurance company; but it furnishes no warrant for avoiding
hard consequences by importing into a contract an ambiguity which other-
wise would not exist, or, under the guise of construction, by forcing from
plain words unusual and unnatural meanings.
Contracts of insurance, like other contracts, must be construed accord-
ing to the terms which the parties have used to be taken and understood, in
the absence of ambiguity, in their plain, ordinary and popular sense.
Id. at 492 (citations omitted).
61. 682 P.2d at 1113.
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its actions are difficult to understand, especially in light of the ac-
cepted interpretation of certain terms in an insurance contract. Specifi-
cally, the "insured" is normally the party whose name is found on the
policy form in a designated area following the words "does insure" or
some other appropriate phrase. A "claimant" is designated in a simi-
lar manner and refers to the insured or a third party who might be
entitled to reimbursement for injuries or damages suffered. 62 The
court in Stewart-Smith Haidinger held that the "insured" named in
this particular contract did not control, as "TNA intended to insure
the aircraft for its own benefit or for the benefit of whoever eventually
purchased it. "63 The court effectively held, then, that it was the own-
ership interest, not the interest of the party designated as "the in-
sured," that was the interest the parties intended to insure under the
contract.
Second, the latest formulation of the doctrine of the implied in-
sured may exceed the bounds of contract construction in another man-
ner. Many jurisdictions have held that the general rule of interpreting
ambiguities in favor of the insured operates only after the identity of
the insured has been determined.64 Under this approach, the use of
the rule favoring the insured would not have been appropriate in Stew-
art-Smith Haidinger. 65 Third, the court found that the parties had not
specifically contemplated that Avi-Truck was to benefit from the in-
surance policy at the time of its writing.66 The insurer did not know of
Avi-Truck's existence, as TWA obtained the insurance policies prior to
Avi-Truck's purchase of the aircraft. 67 Still, the court found that Avi-
Truck was an implied beneficiary of the contract.
The court in Stewart-Smith Haidinger acknowledged that techni-
cally the insurance contract was not intended to benefit any third
party.68 The court appears correct in this assessment because as a gen-
eral rule of contract interpretation, the absence of any evidence show-
ing that the parties intended the contract to benefit a third party leaves
62. White v. Alaska Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 592 P.2d 367, 369 (Alaska 1979).
63. 682 P.2d at 1114 (emphasis added).
64. Wylie v. Mountain Motors, 126 W. Va. 205, 211, 27 S.E.2d 494, 496 (1943);
accord Lazarus v. Manufacturers Casualties Ins. Co., 267 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
United Nuclear Corp. v. Mission Ins. Co., 97 N.M. 647, 651, 642 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Ct.
App. 1982); McBroome-Bennett Plumbing, Inc. v. Villa France, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 32,
37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). Contra American Home Assur. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co.,
190 N.J. Super. 477, 484, 466 A.2d 1128, 1132 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983).
65. The court in Stewart-Smith Haidinger did not address itself to this rule.
66. 682 P.2d at 1112.
67. Id.
68. The Alaska Supreme Court recognized the right of third parties to benefit
under a contract in State v. Osborne, 607 P.2d 369 (Alaska 1980). This right depends
upon the parties to the contract intending that at least one of the purposes of the
contract is to benefit the third party. Id. at 371.
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outsiders as incidental beneficiaries, at best.69 A third party who was
not intended to be a beneficiary cannot therefore claim damages from
any failure by the insurer or the insured to fulfill the contract terms. 70
A third party is also without the ability to change this status unilater-
ally; it cannot make itself a party to the contract merely by acting in
reliance upon the terms bargained for by others.71 These observations
make it clear that the doctrine of the implied insured as applied in
Stewart-Smith Haidinger does not come within the current Alaska
rules governing third party beneficiary contracts. The court in Stew-
art-Smith Haidinger acknowledges this weakness, 72 yet it claims that
"under the special circumstances of this case, a third-party beneficiary
contract should be implied at law."' 73
Other decisions by the Alaska Supreme Court are not very help-
ful in identifying the factual circumstances that will warrant the addi-
tion of a third party to an insurance contract by implication.
Although not decided under the doctrine of the implied insured, the
reasoning of the decision in Syndoulos Lutheran Church v. A.R. C.
Industries, Inc.74 is illustrative. There the court permitted a land-
owner to sue a subcontractor for defective workmanship even though
he was not in privity with the subcontractor.75 The court held that
although the subcontractor had not specifically known the identity of
the landowner at the time it entered the contract with the general con-
tractor, the subcontractor must have known that there would eventu-
ally be an owner and that his work was intended to benefit that
owner.
76
The court had not found that such foresight was required of the
parties in a previous case involving a factual arrangement very similar
to that in Syndoulos. The court in State v. Osborne 77 did not permit
an employee of a building contractor to bring a suit against a home-
owner for unpaid wages after the building contractor had become
bankrupt. The court held that there was no indication that the home-
owner negotiated to have a house built so that he could confer a bene-
fit on the contractor's employees. 78 Although the homeowner must
have known that the contractor would employ workmen when he
69. See United States v. Aleutian Homes, 193 F. Supp. 571, 576 (D. Alaska 1961).
70. Century Ins. Agency v. City Commerce Corp., 396 P.2d 80, 82 (Alaska 1964).
71. White, 592 P.2d at 369.
72. 682 P.2d at 1112.
73. Id.
74. 662 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1983).
75. Id. See also Keel v. Titan Constr. Co., 639 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Okla. 1981).
76. Syndoulos, 662 P.2d at 114.
77. 607 P.2d 369 (Alaska 1980).
78. Id. at 371. See also Williams v. Fenix & Scisson, Inc., 608 F.2d 1205, 1208
(9th Cir. 1979); Paulson v. National Indem. Co., 498 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1972).
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signed the contract, the homeowner intended to confer no benefit on
the workmen. The Alaska Supreme Court has also agreed with the
proposition that the benefit that can be implied from a contract must
surely be somewhat limited when a stranger to the contract attempts
to enforce the contract.79
V. THE RULE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In the course of making its decision in Stewart-Smith Haidinger,
the court examined the available precedent from other jurisdictions on
the doctrine of the implied insured. This examination was appropri-
ate, since the court had limited its previous application of the doctrine,
in RCA, to subrogation claims against the implied insured. 0 Thus, if
the court wished to allow the implied insured to instigate a suit to
collect the proceeds of an insurance policy, it could not rely upon the
doctrine of the implied insured as it stood after RCA and would have
to expand the express limits of the doctrine.
The other jurisdictions the court examined varied in their accept-
ance of the doctrine permitting an implied insured to enforce an insur-
ance contract affirmatively. One case, Farmer's Insurance Exchange v.
Nelson,81 involved a factual situation similar to that in Stewart-Smith
Haidinger. Contrary to a lease provision, the lessee in Nelson obtained
an insurance policy in his own name rather than in the name of the
lessor. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the benefits paya-
ble to the lessee from the insurance policy would be charged with a
lien in favor of the lessor.82 The lessor could then proceed directly
against the insurer as a creditor to recover his pro rata share of the
funds payable under the policy.8 3
A Louisiana case, Taylor v. Audubon Insurance Co.,84 permitted
the buyer of a house to proceed directly against an insurer for his
share of the proceeds of a policy obtained by the seller in her own
name but paid for by the buyer. Like the policy obtained by TNA, the
Taylor policy insured a property interest. The Louisiana Court of Ap-
79. See Rego v. Decker, 482 P.2d 834, 837 (Alaska 1971) (desiring certainty in
contracts).
80. Stewart-Smith Haidinger v. Avi-Truck, Inc., 682 P.2d 1108, 1112 n.2 (Alaska
1984).
81. 479 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
82. Id. at 721. If the insurer is not informed of the lease, it is not bound thereby;
but after the information is given to it, the duty rests upon the insurer to treat the
proceeds of the policy as though such a provision was written into the policy. Fidelity
& Guarantee Ins. Corp. v. Super-Cold Southwest Co., 225 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949).
83. Nelson, 479 S.W.2d at 721.
84. 357 So. 2d 912 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1307 (La. 1978). Com-
pare Moran v. Kenai Towing & Salvage, Inc., 523 P.2d 1237 (Alaska 1974).
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peals found that because the insurer had intended to insure the owner
of the house, the policy could be equitably reformed to include the
buyers as beneficiaries. 85 The Taylor court emphasized its conclusion
that the equitable construction of the contract would not prejudice the
insurer. Because there was no evidence that the company would have
altered the terms of the policy or increased the premium had it known
the buyers were to be the beneficiaries, the court decided it was proper
to reform the contract. 86
The Alaska Supreme Court declined to use the term "reforma-
tion" in its treatment of the contract in Stewart-Smith Haidinger, pre-
ferring instead the term "implication at law" in the creation of a third-
party beneficiary contract. 87 To reform a contract, the court would
have to find that the parties had made a mutual mistake and then
would have to conform the contract to meet the parties' clear inten-
tions.88 The court's hesitation in using the term "reformation," and
its substitution of the language "implication at law," however, is not
overly persuasive considering the court's basis for applying the doc-
trine of the implied insured to Stewart-Smith Haidinger. Although it
is true that the insurer did not know that Avi-Truck existed, the doc-
trine of the implied insured is based upon the idea that the insurer has
contracted to insure a certain class of beneficiaries rather than a par-
ticular individual. The only mistake the parties in Stewart-Smith
Haidinger made was that the parties incorrectly identified TNA as the
representative of the class rather than the true owner, Avi-Truck.8 9 It
is the underlying contract, namely the insurance of an ownership in-
terest, that the court has determined to be controlling, not the owner's
identity.
Acceptance of the implied insured doctrine has not been univer-
sal. Spires v. Hanover Fire Insurance Co.90 and American Empire In-
surance v. Fidelity Deposit Co. 91 are the two leading cases that do not
allow a party unnamed in an insurance policy to proceed directly
against the insurer.
In Spires, a lessee was required to keep an airplane hangar and
85. 357 So. 2d at 915.
86. Id. at 914-15; accord Lighting Fixture & Electric Supply Co. v. Continental
Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1211, 1214 (5th Cir. 1969) (the fact that an incorrect name is
unintentionally or mistakenly inserted in a policy does not provide the insurer with
sufficient grounds for avoiding the policy and reformation for the mutual mistake may
be obtained when the policy, as written, does not insure the person or interest in-
tended to be insured); see also Mat-Su/Blackard/Stephan & Sons v. State, 647 P.2d
1101, 1104 (Alaska 1982).
87. Stewart-Smith Haidinger, 682 P.2d at 1113 n.3.
88. Riley v. Northern Commercial Co., 648 P.2d 961, 969 (Alaska 1982).
89. See also Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608, 611-13 (Alaska 1980).
90. 364 Pa. 52, 70 A.2d 828 (1950).
91. 408 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1969) (construing Florida law).
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any buildings she herself erected on her rented property in good condi-
tion. If a building was damaged, the lease required the lessee to
restore it to its original condition by the end of the lease period. The
lessee purchased a fire insurance policy covering all the buildings on
the property. The Spires court denied the lessor standing to bring a
suit to enforce the insurance contract for two reasons. First, the lessee
had an insurable interest that was separate from that of the lessor, her
interest being the value of the hangar she was bound to restore at the
conclusion of the lease period rather that the lessor's possessory inter-
est in the hangar. Second, the policy did not name the lessor as an
intended beneficiary. 92 As in Stewart-Smith Haidinger, the insurer in
Spires was not even aware of the lessor's existence. The Spires court
followed the strict rule of construction that a "promissor cannot be
held liable to an alleged beneficiary of a contract unless the latter was
within his contemplation at the time the contract was entered into and
such liability was intentionally assumed by him in his undertaking." 93
The Alaska Supreme Court declined to follow Spires on the
ground that the Pennsylvania court rested its holding in part on a find-
ing that the risk to the insurer would be altered if a third party was
allowed to proceed directly against it.94 The Spires court had deter-
mined that adding more parties as potential insureds increases the
probability that a claim will be filed, and thus also increases the possi-
bility and the magnitude of litigation facing the insurer.95 The court
in Stewart-Smith Haidinger avoided this argument by deferring to the
trial court's finding that the insurer's risk had not been increased by
allowing Avi-Truck to bring this suit.96
The Spires court recognized that the substantive rights of the in-
surer were affected when it was faced with a potential proliferation of
litigants. First, the insurer has the right to choose the person whom it
is willing to insure.97 Second, the insurer has the right to deal with the
named insured whether in negotiating a settlement or in honoring a
92. Spires, 364 Pa. at 56, 70 A.2d at 830.
93. Id. at 57, 70 A.2d at 830-31.
94. Stewart-Smith Haidinger, 682 P.2d at 1113 n.4.
95. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
96. 682 P.2d at 1113 n.4.
97. Chief Justice Maxey elaborated further on the right of an insurer to choose his
insured in a very concise concurring opinion:
A contract of insurance is as much a personal one as is a contract to marry.
An insurer is concerned with the moral risk as well as with the material risk
involved in an insurance contract. A fire insurance company will not insure
a man's property if the man has had too many fires. A casualty company
will not insure a car owner if the owner has had too many accidents. An
insurance company cannot be forced to enter into a contractual relationship
with anybody.
Spires, 364 Pa. at 60, 70 A.2d at 835 (Maxey, C. J., concurring).
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claim.98 The Alaska Supreme Court in Stewart-Smith Haidinger failed
to recognize these rights and instead focused on the possibility that the
insurance company would be unjustly enriched if it did not honor Avi-
Truck's claim. 99 Although the court does not expressly state this con-
cern,100 it appears troubled that Avi-Truck would be without any rem-
edy if it was not allowed to pursue the insurer directly.
Such a concern with a party's inability to recover may not be
appropriate for the court to consider when interpreting an insurance
contract. The fact that an insurer is liable to a named insured does not
create a legal liability for the insurer to an unnamed third party simply
because the third party has a claim against the named insured. In
American Empire, the Fifth Circuit directly addressed this issue in a
case involving an insured who failed to make premium payments to
the ultimate detriment of some non-parties to the insurance con-
tract.' 0 ' The court denied recovery to the non-parties, stating that
"The claims of the third party are not against the [insurer] but against
the named insured or their receiver for failure to account to
[them.]"102
When compared with the remedies available to the principal par-
ties to a contract, the remedies available to a third party outside the
contract are generally limited. Still, in most situations the inability of
the third party to proceed directly against the insurer would not extin-
guish its ability to be made whole. 10 3 In a case such as Stewart-Smith
Haidinger, where the lessor would not be able to collect directly from
the insurer on the insurance contract, the lessor could still sue the
lessee to enforce the appropriate provisions of the lease and in effect
become the ultimate beneficiary of the insurance contract.1 4 Upon
obtaining the insurance proceeds, the insured, in this case the lessee,
would then retain only that portion of the policy proceeds that com-
pensated it for loss to any actual interest the insured might have had in
the property. The insured would hold the remainder of the proceeds
98. Id. at 59, 70 A.2d at 831-32.
99. 682 P.2d at 1113.
100. The trial court had rejected Avi-Truck's attempt to gain standing as TNA's
assignee. See supra note 29. The court may have viewed granting Avi-Truck standing
as an implied beneficiary as the only means to allow the company to be indemnified
for a loss the court felt it should not suffer.
101. 408 F.2d at 74.
102. Id. at 76. This conclusion is based upon the rule that parties are presumed to
contract only for themselves absent any clearly expressed intent to confer a benefit
upon another. Id.
103. See Spires, 364 Pa. at 58, 70 A.2d at 831 (acknowledging that third party
status affects substantive, not just procedural, rights).




in a constructive trust for any others who have an interest in the
property.,o 5
Restricting third parties' remedies under an insurance contract to
an action against the insured may also be desirable from the stand-
point of judicial economy. The parties to a suit over an insurance con-
tract would then be limited to those who, on the face of the contract,
have the power to enforce it. These parties not only have the ability to
enforce the contract, but also can release the other party from its obli-
gations. Restricting the litigation to the contractual parties thus will
involve only those "who [have] control over an action to enforce
rights, and not necessarily the person who may ultimately be entitled
to the benefit of any recovery obtained, nor the person beneficially in-
terested in the outcome."' 10 6
Although the Alaska Supreme Court distinguished Spires from
Stewart-Smith Haidinger because the supposed alteration of the risk in
Spires was not present in Stewart-Smith Haidinger, the court's distinc-
tion would rest more appropriately on the existence of alternative rem-
edies available to the third party in Spires. In Stewart-Smith
Haidinger, Avi-Truck had no alternative remedy since TNA was no
longer a viable corporation and could not exercise its rights. 10 7 If Avi-
Truck was to receive any compensation for its loss, the court had to
provide an equitable link between Avi-Truck and the insurer. Stewart-
Smith Haidinger's reliability as a precedent could depend upon the
court's subsequent willingness to recognize the lack of any alternative
remedy as a prerequisite for an application of the implied insured doc-
trine. While the facts suggest that all such alternative remedies must
be so exhausted, the court did not include this factor among the nu-
merous limitations it imposed on the scope of its holding.
VI. THE STRICTER STANDARDS OF JUSTICE RABINOWITZ
Justice Rabinowitz has repeatedly stressed that judicial interpre-
tations of contracts should adhere to the intent of the parties.'0 8 In
previous cases in which the Alaska Supreme Court defined the rights
105. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Alberstadt, 383 Pa. 556, 119 A.2d 83, 85-86
(1956).
106. West Penn. Admin., Inc. v. Union Nat'l of Pittsburgh, 233 Pa. Super. 311,
327, 335 A.2d 725, 732 (Pa. 1975); see also Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Waterhouse,
424 A.2d 675, 679 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980); Donovan v. New York Casualty, 373 Pa.
145, 147-48, 94 A.2d 570, 571 (1953).
107. Stewart-Smith Haidinger, 682 P.2d at 1113.
108. Olympic, Inc. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 648 P.2d 1008, 1014 (Alaska
1982) (Matthews, J., with whom Rabinowitz, C.J., joins, dissenting); Alaska Ins. Co.
v. RCA Alaska Communications, Inc., 623 P.2d 1216, 1220 (Alaska 1981) (Rabino-
witz, C.J., dissenting); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Colver, 600 P.2d 1, 4 (Alaska
1979) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
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of strangers to an insurance policy, Justice Rabinowitz consistently
joined or filed dissents that stressed deference to the bargained-for
terms. In Stewart-Smith Haidinger, however, Justice Rabinowitz
joined in the court's opinion.
Justice Rabinowitz has not objected to the principle that the court
may find an implied insured from a contract; rather, his analysis has
recognized that when no overwhelming public policy considerations
are involved, parties should be allowed to bargain for terms according
to their own preferences 0 9 rather than having the judiciary imply
the terms from the contract. Judicially imposed terms, in Justice
Rabinowitz's view, should not control unless the underlying contract
utterly fails to provide for the situation that led to the litigation. 110
Leaving the parties to the terms of their bargain is particularly appro-
priate when neither party could be characterized as unsophisticated in
the area of contracts. 1 '
Justice Rabinowitz expressed no displeasure with the court's find-
ing in Stewart-Smith Haidinger that the policy involved was intended
to insure an ownership interest in the aircraft rather than the lessee's
interest actually held by TNA. As will be shown in the next section,
the court's conclusion that the insurance contract concerned the own-
ership interest in the aircraft and not TNA's actual interest keeps
the doctrine of the implied insured as expanded in Stewart-Smith
Haidinger within Alaska's statutory framework for interpreting insur-
ance contracts.
VII. ALASKA'S STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING
INSURANCE POLICIES
Under the Alaska statutory scheme for regulating insurance con-
tracts, only persons with an insurable interest in the insured item at
the time of the loss may enforce an insurance contract.112 Title 21 of
the Alaska Statutes defines an insurable interest as "an actual, lawful,
and substantial economic interest in the safety or preservation of the
subject of the insurance free from any loss, destruction, pecuniary
damage or impairment."'1 3 Under this definition, as the owner of the
aircraft Avi-Truck unquestionably had an insurable interest in the
aircraft.
109. RCA, 623 P.2d at 1220 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1220 n.1 (quoting R. KEEToN, INSURANCE LAW § 4.4(b), at 210
(1971)).
111. Id. at 1220.
112. ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.030(a) (1984).
113. Id. § 21.42.030(c) (1984). Alaska prohibits anyone from obtaining insurance




The controlling factor in determining the rights of a property
holder, however, is whether the insurance policy covers the property
interest the holder is seeking to enforce. In Stewart-Smith Haidinger,
the insurer thought that it was covering TNA in its capacity as the
owner of the aircraft. The property interest the parties intended the
contract to cover was an ownership interest in the aircraft. 114 The
Alaska statutory scheme, however, apparently does not provide for
separate recognition of the property interests of an owner and a
lessee.11 5 The pertinent section of Title 21 reads: "When the name of
the person insured is specified in a policy insuring property, the insur-
ance can be applied only to the proper interest of the person in-
sured."1 16 The supreme court has interpreted this statute as governing
only the relationship between the contractual parties. Consequently,
the statutory language would not reach any equitable relationship that
might exist between the insurer and a third party.117
As the court in Stewart-Smith Haidinger used its equitable pow-
ers to substitute Avi-Truck for TNA within the contract, the pivotal
question in evaluating the legitimacy of the court's decision then be-
comes whether TNA's "proper interest in the aircraft" was its actual
interest as a lessee or the interest of an owner, as the insurer believed it
to be at the time the parties entered into the contract.118 Because the
insurer's belief that it was insuring the ownership interest in the air-
craft is consistent with the greater property interest that Avi-Truck is
trying to enforce, interpreting the policy to insure the ownership inter-
est would not necessarily be inconsistent with the statute. This inter-
pretation is particularly consistent in light of the fact that TNA was
under its own contractual obligation to obtain insurance to protect the
ownership interest in the aircraft. The court in Moran v. Kenai Tow-
ing & Salvage, Inc. 119 followed this interpretation of the statute. There
the court construed a policy obtained by a mortgagee to include the
property interests of both the mortgagor and the mortgagee.'20
A prime concern of the legislature in enacting Title 21 was its
desire to insure that an insurance company should not be legally obli-
114. Brief for Appellee at 29, Stewart-Smith Haidinger v. Avi-Truck, Inc., 682
P.2d 1108 (Alaska 1984). It should be noted that this is consistent with the insurer's
claim that it believed it was dealing with the owner in TNA.
115. ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.040 (1984); see generally Currier v. North British
Elec. Co., 101 A.2d 266, 268 (N.H. 1953) (insurance is a personal contract that pro-
vides coverage only for the interest of the insured, not insurance for the property as
such).
116. ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.040 (1984).
117. Moran v. Kenai Towing & Salvage, Inc., 523 P.2d 1237, 1240 n.2 (Alaska
1974).





gated to compensate for the loss of a property interest greater than it
had contemplated in the contract. 121 The policy in Stewart-Smith
Haidinger was intended to insure the entire value of the aircraft.
Thus, as applied in Stewart-Smith Haidinger, the doctrine of the im-
plied insured does not conflict with the statutory objective. If the leg-
islature does not approve of unnamed parties enforcing insurance
contracts, it has not made this intention clear to the judiciary. A re-
striction could be written into the framework of Title 21 easily, and
should be included if the legislature wishes to curtail the rights of im-
plied beneficiaries.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Stewart-Smith Haidinger marks the expansion of the implied in-
sured doctrine in Alaska. Where the risk to the insurer is unchanged,
meaning the insurable interest remains the same as that contemplated
by the insurer, and where a third party is within the class the parties
intended to benefit from a policy, an insurance contract may be im-
plied at law in favor of an unnamed third party. The court's restric-
tions upon this expansion, however, leave some doubts regarding the
proper application of the doctrine to various factual scenarios. First,
the court's examination of the alteration of the insurer's risk was not
an exhaustive one. Most importantly, the court failed to recognize
that insured risks should be interpreted with regard to the potentiali-
ties that existed at the time of contracting rather than the actual re-
sults of subsequent events.
Also, the court's restrictions are silent on the significance of the
availability of alternative remedies for the implied insured and
whether the unavailability of such remedies is an important prerequi-
site to proper application of the doctrine. While Avi-Truck was with-
out satisfactory alternatives in this particular case, the court did not
acknowledge this fact. Finally, the court failed to mention whether or
not the signatory to the contract must be incapable of enforcing its
own rights, as TNA was here, before the doctrine may be applied. The
court did not indicate what its holding would have been if the original
insured, TNA, was still a viable corporation at the time of the
litigation.
The factual situation presented in Stewart-Smith Haidinger was
well suited for the court's exercise of its equitable powers. Still, the
court failed to assess the impact of the individual factors that appear
to justify its equitable intervention. The broad qualifying language
purporting to limit the doctrine of the implied insured does not ad-
dress all such factors. Greater guidance is needed from the court to
121. ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.040 (1984).
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prevent the doctrine of the implied insured from becoming a destabi-
lizing force in Alaska's insurance industry.
Thomas W. Peterson
